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Six studies investigated a possible link between hopeless explanatory style—that is, the
habitual explanation of bad events with stable and global causes—and risk for trau-
matic injuries. In samples of college students, dancers, athletes, and trauma patients
(total n = 2274), stable and global explanations for bad events correlated with the
occurrence of mishaps. The link appeared to be mediated in part by a preference for
potentially hazardous settings and activities in response to negative moods associated
with hopelessness. Taken together, these findings suggest that catastrophizing individu-
als may be motivated to escape negative moods by preferring exciting but risky courses
of action.
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In a study of psychological risk factors for untimely death, Peterson, Seligman,
Yurko, Martin, and Friedman (1998) discovered that individuals who as young adults
explained the causes of bad events with pervasive and long-lasting causes were more
likely decades later to die from accidents. This finding was unanticipated because
of speculation that explanatory style is linked to poor health by immunological
or cardiological pathways or both (Peterson & Bossio, 1991; Peterson, Maier, &
Seligman, 1993). Nonetheless, the finding makes sense given that explanatory style
emerged from the attributional reformulation of helplessness theory, where it is con-
sidered a distal influence on helpless behavior (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,
1978). People who explain bad events with causes that are general across time and
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situation are thought to display stable and global helplessness (Peterson & Seligman,
1984).
Lifestyle—that is, habitual behavior—contributes to many accidental deaths
by determining the settings that people enter and what they do in these settings.
Helpless individuals are dysphoric, socially estranged, and poor problem solvers.
They are inattentive to the relationships between actions and outcomes. None of
these characteristics bodes well for their ability to avoid or escape hazards. If an
individual encounters enough dangerous situations, an accidental death eventually
occurs, or so Peterson et al. (1998) hypothesized.
The present investigations took as their point of departure this line of rea-
soning. Peterson et al.’s (1998) sample was the well-known Terman subjects,
individuals originally selected as adolescents because of their high intelligence and
followed throughout their lives (e.g., Terman & Oden, 1947). Although the Terman
sample is a unique source of longitudinal information, further questions about ex-
planatory style and traumatic mishaps remain that can only be answered with other
evidence. Two questions in particular guided the present research. First, does a
hopeless explanatory style predict nonfatal mishaps? Second, assuming that the
link is found, what processes lead from this explanatory style to traumatic
accidents?
STUDY 1
The first study attempted to see if explanatory style was associated with nonfatal
mishaps among a sample of college students. These research participants completed a
measure of explanatory style and reported the number of accidents requiring medical
attention experienced in the past 2 years.
Method
In 1997, at the University of Michigan, 460 introductory psychology students
(42% male; 70% White; average age = 19 years) completed questionnaires the first
day of class, including the item: “During the past 24 months, how many accidents,
assaults, injuries, or poisonings did you experience that required medical attention?”
This question is a standard phrasing from epidemiological surveys of traumatic acci-
dents, and available options ranged from 0 to 9+.
Participants also completed an abbreviated version of the Attributional Style
Questionnaire asking them to rate on 7-point scales how they usually explained
bad events: with stable (vs. unstable) causes and with global (vs. specific) causes
(Peterson et al., 1982). Specifically, these questions were as follows: “When a bad
thing happens to you, is the cause of this event usually” not at all long-lasting (0)
or extremely long-lasting (6); and “When a bad thing happens to you, does the
cause of this event usually” affect just this type of event (0) or affect many types of
events (6)? For comparability with previous studies of explanatory style, these ratings
were converted from 0–6 to 1–7 scales. Stability and globality ratings were entwined
(r = .55, p < .001) and were combined into a single score. Research participants also
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provided demographic information such as gender, ethnicity, and handedness, and
they responded to the brief form (13 items) of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Beck, Rial, & Rickels, 1974).
Results
Table I presents the means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of these vari-
ables. Predicting the number of accidents requiring medical attention were stability
and globality of explanatory style (r = .12, p < .05), depressive symptoms (r = .09,
p < .05), male gender (r = .13, p < .05), and non–right-handedness (r = .11,
p < .05). These zero-order correlations are modest but replicate what is known about
risk factors for accidents. However, ethnicity, coded as 1 (White) versus 0 (not White),
was unrelated to accidents (r = .01, ns; cf. Baker, O’Neill, Ginsburg, & Li, 1992).
Consistent with previous research, explanatory style and depressive symptoms were
correlated (r = .40, p < .05).
All of these variables (except ethnicity) were then included in an ordinary least-
squares multiple regression to predict the number of reported mishaps. The pre-
dictors were entered in blocks, first gender and handedness, then depressive symp-
toms, and finally explanatory style. The overall regression was significant (R2 = .04,
F = 4.58, p < .001). Explanatory style was a significant predictor (β = .11, t = 2.15,
p < .04), even after controlling for the effects of male gender (β = .13, t = 2.67,
p < .008), right-handedness (β = −.10, t = 2.04, p < .05), and depressive symptoms
(β = .03, ns).
Table I. Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliabilities of Measures
Study n Accidents Explanatory style Other measures
1 460 x̄ = .71 (1.11) x̄ = 3.19 (1.37); Short BDI: x̄ = 3.78 (4.19);
α = .71 α = .84
2 139 9% x̄ = 4.17 (0.78); BDI: x̄ = 6.46 (4.04); α = .77
α = .70
3 58 x̄ = 1.07 (1.52) x̄ = 4.79 (0.88); BDI: x̄ = 4.57 (5.24); α = .90
α = .86
Chance LOC: x̄ = 3.23 (0.96);
α = .72
Neuroticism: x̄ = 10.77 (4.71);
α = .80
Extraversion: x̄ = 14.34 (4.01);
α = .78
Sensation seeking:
x̄ = 20.53 (5.85); α = .75
4 141 x̄ = 1.73 (1.62) x̄ = 4.78 (0.84); Mood at time of accident
α = .84 (n = 104); x̄ = 37.3 (30.2);
α = .93
5 1258 x̄ = 0.39 (0.95) x̄ = 3.10 (1.54) Psychological problems: 30%
Reckless response to negative
mood: x̄ = 0.71 (0.83)
6 218 x̄ = 0.43 (0.75) x̄ = 4.44 (1.44); Dangerous habits:
α = .56 x̄ = 0.42 (0.44); α = .71
Note. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Discussion
Individuals who explained bad events with stable and global causes were more
likely to have experienced recent accidents, even when demographic risk factors
and depressive symptoms were controlled, which would seem to rule out a simple
explanation in terms of complaining or exaggeration. These findings are consistent
with those of Peterson et al. (1998) showing that explanatory style is a risk factor for
accidental death, but the present study is limited. Data were retrospective, and the
measure of explanatory style was but two items.
STUDY 2
We undertook a second investigation, this time measuring explanatory style in a
more typical way and conducting the research prospectively. This second study rean-
alyzed already gathered longitudinal data concerning explanatory style, depressive
symptoms, and life events (Peterson & Villanova, 1988).
Method
In 1985, introductory psychology students at Virginia Tech completed question-
naires at two times, in small groups of approximately 10–12, in single sessions on
each occasion. At Time 1, a total of 140 students (36% males; 95% White; average
age= 19 years) completed the expanded version of the ASQ (Peterson & Villanova,
1988), which presents respondents with 24 bad events and asks them to offer the
one major cause of the event and then to rate it on 7-point scales according to its
internality, stability, and globality; they also completed the long form (21 items) of
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh,
1961). Again, stability and globality ratings were entwined (r = .55, p < .001) and
were combined into a single score.
Four weeks later, 139 of these subjects returned to complete a second set of
questionnaires, which included brief descriptions of the “four worst events” that had
actually occurred to them in the past month. Two researchers blind to other informa-
tion about the research participants independently coded these events as 1 (traumatic
accidents) or 0 (not), and their agreement was perfect. Indeed, this coding was done
in 1985, and the researchers were unaware of the present hypothesis, formulated
15 years later. The vast majority of these events were academic or social setbacks,
but 13 of the subjects (9%) described an unintentional trauma potentially requir-
ing medical attention (4 motor vehicle accidents, 3 broken bones, 2 muscle/ligament
strains, 2 fires, and 2 infections secondary to accidental injuries).
Results
Neither sex nor race nor internality of explanatory style was related to the oc-
currence of traumatic accidents. Table I presents the means, standard deviations, and
reliabilities of the remaining measures. Stability and globality of explanatory style
predicted whether research participants experienced an accident (r = .22, p < .05).
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BDI scores were unrelated to accidents (r = .02, ns), although they were correlated
with stability and globality of explanatory style (r = .34, p < .05). A logistic regres-
sion was computed to predict the occurrence of accidents. BDI scores were entered
first, followed by explanatory style scores. Only explanatory style was a significant
predictor (B= 1.30, Wald statistic = 6.73, p < .01).
Discussion
Study 2 corrected some of the flaws in the design of the first investigations.
Explanatory style was measured with a typical ASQ, and accidents were predicted
prospectively. Although only 9% of the research participants experienced an accident
in the 1-month time period, those who did were more likely to explain the causes of
bad events with stable and global causes. As in Study 1, these results were obtained
even when depressive symptoms were controlled.
STUDY 3
The results of these two investigations, coupled with those of Peterson et al.
(1998), establish a correlation between stability and globality of explanatory style
and traumatic accidents. What is responsible for this link? Our next study examined
some of the psychological risk factors shown in previous research to predispose acci-
dents: depression, external locus of control, neuroticism, extraversion, and sensation
seeking (e.g., Dahlback, 1991; McKenna, 1983; Slovic, Kunreuther, & White, 1974).
Method
In 1997, a total of 58 male introductory psychology students at the University of
Michigan (72% White; average age = 19 years) were recruited to participate in this
investigation based on information provided on the first day of class in response to
the question “During the past 24 months, how many accidents, assaults, injuries, or
poisonings did you experience that required medical attention?” Available options
ranged from 0 to 9+, and an attempt was made to overrepresent male research par-
ticipants who reported two or more such accidents by calling them on the telephone
and inviting them to participate in the study; the specific reason was not conveyed.
The remaining participants simply signed up for the study per standard subject pool
protocol at the University of Michigan; there was no information on the sign-up sheet
except that the study was limited to males. The final sample consisted of 16 (28%)
individuals who had experienced two or more accidents; the remaining participants
reported none (52%) or only one (20%) accident during the past 2 years. With only
a few exceptions, the 58 research participants in Study 3 were included among the
460 individuals in Study 1.
In small groups of 5–8, the research participants in a single session completed
the following questionnaires: (a) demographics; (b) number of accidents in the
past 24 months; (c) an open-ended description of the most serious accident they
had experienced in this time, if there had been one; (d) short form of the BDI;
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(e) Levenson’s chance locus of control (LOC) scale (Levenson, 1974); (f) Eysenck’s
Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985), which yields
separate scores for extraversion and neuroticism; (g) Zuckerman’s Sensation Seek-
ing Scale Form V (SSS V; Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978), which yields an
overall score as well as separate scores for thrill and adventure seeking, experience
seeking, disinhibition, and boredom susceptibility; and (h) a 10-item version of the
ASQ in which respondents provide ratings of the stability and globality of causes
(Dykema, Bergbower, Doctora, & Peterson, 1996). Again, stability and globality
scores were highly correlated (r = .66) and were combined. Means, standard devia-
tions, and reliabilities for these scales are reported in Table I.
Results
Simple correlations were first computed among the various measures.9 Stability
and globality scores were correlated with BDI scores (r = .43, p < .05). The only
significant predictors of the number of accidents reported were explanatory style
(r = .34, p < .05) and extraversion (r = .28, p < .05), and these characteristics were
independent of one another (r = .09, ns). No obvious candidate for a mediator be-
tween explanatory style and accidents was suggested by the pattern of correlations.
Exploratory Analyses and Discussion
Neither overall sensation seeking nor any of the four subscales of the SSS V was
related to accidents, which at first was surprising. A closer look at the SSS V items
revealed that some involve seeking sensations potentially associated with danger
(e.g., drinking, going to wild parties), whereas others involve seeking sensations
per se (e.g., preferring modern art). So, a new scale was formed by choosing items
that entailed a preference for doing things that would arguably increase the risk of
mishaps.10 Seven items were chosen for this new scale (items 1, 6, 11, 12, 18, 25,
and 30 from the original SSS V), which we refer to as the Preference for Dangerous
Activities Scale.11
The internal consistency of this new scale (x̄ = 4.14, SD= 1.80) was satisfactory
(α = .77), and it was correlated with accidents on the one hand (r = .44, p < .001) and
with stable and global explanatory style on the other (r = .34, p < .009), suggesting
that it might be a mediator. We followed the strategy outlined by Kenny, Kashy, and
Bolger (1998) for identifying mediation. That is, variable M mediates a correlation
9Because the sample was created to overrepresent high scores on accidents, treating the number of
accidents as a continuous variable in correlational analyses may not be strictly warranted. All of the
analyses reported here were repeated with a dichotomous version of the accidents variable (0 or 1 vs.
2+), and the identical patterns of significant results were obtained.
10We also created a new scale by choosing SSS V items that entailed a preference for dangerous sports
such as mountain climbing, high diving, and sailing, but scores on this scale were related neither to
explanatory style nor to reported accidents.
11In a parallel investigation by our research group, we found that scores on the Preference for Dangerous
Activities Scale predicted the number of car “crashes” by male college students in a driving simulation
(San Francisco Rush, a game for the Nintendo 64 video system), thus supporting the construct validity
of this measure (Fletcher, 1999)
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between a predictor variable X and a criterion variable Y if (i) X correlates with
Y, (ii) X correlates with M, and (iii) M correlates with Y after controlling for X.
Complete or full mediation is inferred if the contribution of X becomes zero after
controlling for M; otherwise, only partial mediation can be inferred.
We used ordinary least-squares regression to predict accidents from explanatory
style (entered first) and Preference for Dangerous Activities (entered second). The
overall regression was significant (R2 = .23, F = 8.37, p < .001). Consistent with
a hypothesis of partial mediation, Preference for Dangerous Activities remained a
significant predictor of accidents (β = .36, t = 2.89, p < .005), and the contribution
of explanatory style became nonsignificant (β = .26, t = 1.72, p < .10).
The results of Study 3 replicate the association between explanatory style and
the occurrence of traumatic accidents, and imply that a preference for potentially
dangerous activities and settings might mediate this association. Other individual
differences—depressive symptoms, chance LOC, extraversion, neuroticism, and sen-
sation seeking per se—played no apparent mediating role. Individuals who explain
bad events with stable and global causes may put themselves in potentially dangerous
positions where accidents are more likely.
What is surprising about this interpretation is that individuals with such an
explanatory style are thought to be helpless—passive and demoralized. We might
expect them not to remove themselves from harm’s way, but we would not expect
them to choose to be there in the first place. Such a choice, however dangerous it may
prove to be, is an active response at apparent odds with what is meant by learned
helplessness (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993).
Leı́th and Baumeister’s (1996) research suggests an explanation. These investi-
gators showed that people in negative moods are motivated to escape their unhap-
piness by embarking on activities that promise high hedonic payoff. They apparently
do not consider the possibility that high payoff activities may also entail risk for loss
or danger. Leı́th and Baumeister supported their argument experimentally, creat-
ing negative moods among research participants and then providing them choices
that varied along dimensions of payoff and risk. If we generalize their findings to
people in chronic negative moods—and certainly “helpless” individuals would fall
into this group—we would predict that they prefer dangerous activities and settings if
these promise pleasure that might take them, however temporarily, away from their
unhappiness.12
12The research participants in Study 3 who had experienced accidents in the past 24 months were asked
to describe briefly the most serious of these. We coded the accidents as happening during activities
that seemed fun (e.g., drinking, snowboarding) and those that did not (e.g., working, doing household
chores). The rule used was whether the activity was recreational or social versus not, and the inde-
pendent agreement of two researchers blind to other information about the research participants was
perfect. Individuals whose accidents occurred while attempting to have fun (n = 24) scored higher on
our Preference for Dangerous Activities Scale than did those participants whose accidents occurred
otherwise (n = 4), 4.99 versus 3.50, t = 2.63, p < .05. They also reported more overall accidents, 2.38
versus 1.25, t = 2.78, p < .01. Explanatory style scores were unrelated to the “fun” variable, perhaps
because the variance in explanatory style was reduced by limiting analyses just to individuals who had
experienced an accident. Leı́th and Baumeister (1996) concluded that only arousing negative moods
(e.g., anger, anxiety, or embarrassment) lead to risk taking, which may explain why BDI scores related
neither to Preference for Dangerous Activities nor to the occurrence of “fun” accidents in Study 3.
Individuals who favor stable and global explanations for bad events are often depressed but experience
as well the gamut of negative emotions, including arousing ones (Peterson et al., 1993).
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STUDY 4
Do individuals with a hopeless explanatory style experience more accidental
injuries as a function of the negative moods they habitually experience? We inves-
tigated this question in a sample of young adults, recruiting individuals from groups
we suspected to be at high risk for injuries: serious participants in sports or dance.
We asked these individuals to complete a version of the ASQ and to describe how
many accidental injuries they had recently experienced while participating in their
chosen athletic or artistic pursuit. If they had experienced one or more injuries, they
used a standard mood scale, the Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, &
Droppleman, 1971), to describe their feelings immediately prior to the most severe
injury; the POMS was scored for the present purposes by summing responses indica-
tive of negative mood. We expected that athletes/dancers with a hopeless explanatory
style would report more negative moods at the time of an accident, and, further, that
those who reported more negative moods would report a greater number of accidents.
Method
Research participants were a convenience sample of 141 young adults in south-
east Michigan, recruited by research assistants from the University of Michigan (UM)
Central Campus Recreation Building, the Eastern Michigan University (EMU)
Recreation Center, practices of nonvarsity sports teams at UM and EMU, and
dance classes at UM and in the Ann Arbor community. The sample was 36% male,
85% White, and on average 24 years of age. There were 99 athletes, regular partici-
pants in such sports as triathlon, cheerleading, soccer, and volleyball; and 42 dancers,
mostly students of modern dance, jazz, ballet, and various ethnic dances. Neither
gender, nor age, nor whether a research participant was an athlete or dancer had an
effect on any of the results reported, and these contrasts are not mentioned again.
Research participants on average had pursued their favored activity for 9.8 years
(41% of their lifetime).
Each research participant was paid $10 for completing and returning by mail a
packet of questionnaires. The questionnaires addressed (a) demographics, including
the major form of sport/dance and extent of participation; (b) number of injuries that
occurred during the past 12 months while participating in the major sport/dance; (c) if
at least one injury had occurred, questions about the most severe of these injuries,
including negative mood at the time immediately prior to it, using the POMS; and
(d) the 10-item version of the ASQ described in Study 3, in which respondents
provide ratings of the stability and globality of causes. Once again, stability and
globality scores were highly correlated (r = .55, p < .001) and were combined into a
single score. Reliabilities for all these scales are reported in Table I, along with their
means and standard deviations.
Results
The correlation between stability and globality of explanatory style and number
of accidents was significant (r = .34, p < .01), replicating the results already reported.
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Among the 104 research participants who had experienced at least one accident in the
past 12 months, negative mood at the time of the most severe accident was correlated
as predicted with explanatory style on the one hand (r = .26, p < .01) and with num-
ber of accidents on the other (r = .29, p < .01), suggesting mediation. Explanatory
style and negative mood were then included in an ordinary least-squares to predict
the number of reported accidents. Explanatory style was entered first, then neg-
ative mood. The overall regression was significant (R2 = .16, F = 9.06, p < .001).
Negative mood remained a significant predictor (β = .23, t = 2.35, p < .02) and
so did explanatory style (β = .27, t = 2.82, p < .01), suggesting that mood par-
tially but not completely mediated the association between explanatory style and
accidents.
The analyses just described were based on the subset of research participants
with at least one accidental injury. Although these individuals were the majority of
the sample (70%), the results do not directly address mood differences between par-
ticipants who experienced no accidents versus those who experienced one or more.
However, we were able to shed some light on this matter by comparing the POMS
scores of the present research participants (who had experienced accidents) with
normative data from 2086 athletes provided by Terry and Hall (1996). Our injured
athletes and dancers reported more negative moods than did other athletes in the
course of (mishap-free) participation (37.3 vs. 30.0, t = 2.43, p < .05). The analyses
already reported were repeated by assigning these normative POMS scores to each
of the noninjured dancers/athletes and thus including all the research participants in
the correlational and regression analyses. All of the results previously obtained were
replicated and indeed more robustly.
If they had experienced an accident, we asked our research participants to rate
on 5-point scales how risky they considered the activity during which the accident
occurred as well as how important it was. Almost 70% of the injured dancers and
athletes gave a 1 or 2 rating for riskiness, meaning that they did not regard the
activity as potentially dangerous; in contrast, almost 60% of them gave a 4 or 5
rating for importance, meaning that they regarded it as having potentially desirable
consequences. Explanatory style was not related to rated riskiness (r = .00, ns), but
it was correlated with rated importance (r = .20, p < .05). Together, these findings
support our thesis that hopeless individuals prefer high pay-off activities while not
appreciating potential risks (cf. Leı́th & Baumeister, 1996).
Discussion
Study 4 provides explicit support for the argument we are developing that the
link between hopeless explanatory style and traumatic accidents is mediated in part
by negative mood. When asked to describe their mood at the time of the most severe
injury experienced during the past year, the research participants described negative
moods (relative to normative mood data) and especially so if they had a hopeless
explanatory style. The more hopeless their explanatory style, the more negative
their mood, and the more negative their mood, the more likely they were to report
additional traumatic mishaps. However, negative mood did not fully mediate the link
between explanatory style and accidents.
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Study 4 used a convenience sample, thereby limiting generality. Nonetheless,
the results were unaffected by age, gender, or whether the research participant was
an athlete or dancer. A more serious limitation of these results was the study’s retro-
spective design. We assumed that research participants could reconstruct their moods
with fidelity months after a traumatic accident, but one can question this assump-
tion. Our best argument in favor of taking these reports at face value is that they
converged with the findings of the other studies reported here. Again, following Leı́th
and Baumeister (1996), we suggest that our hopeless dancers and athletes, because of
their negative moods, did not properly estimate the riskiness of the activities that led
to their injuries. Perhaps they did so because the promise of relief from their mood
led them to ignore the risk altogether, or perhaps they did so because their judgments
of risk became more deliberate and uncertain (i.e., confused; Forgas, 1995).
STUDY 5
Study 4 linked negative mood to accidents and further implied that negative
moods may be involved in the hypothesized process that results in traumatic injury.
However, Study 4 did not address a final piece of our interpretation, namely that
hopeless individuals behave recklessly in response to negative moods. So, the next
study we undertook was a survey asking college students how they typically explained
bad events, how many accidents they had recently experienced that required medical
attention, and how they usually responded to negative moods.
Method
In 1999, at the University of Michigan, 1316 introductory psychology students
(44% male; 74% White; average age = 19 years) completed a variety of question-
naires the first day of class, including the same question described for Study 1 concern-
ing the number of accidents in the last 12 months requiring medical attention. They
also used the 7-point scale described for Study 1 to rate how they usually explained
bad events: with global (vs. specific) causes. Research participants also provided
demographic information such as gender and ethnicity, and they responded to a sin-
gle question asking if they had ever experienced psychological problems (1 = yes,
0 = no). Finally, on 5-point scales (0 = never , 4 = always), they answered the ques-
tion “When I am in a bad mood, usually I . . .” with respect to each of these responses:
(a) distract myself by eating or drinking; (b) do something reckless or dangerous;
(c) get together with close friends; (d) just ignore how I feel; (e) listen to music,
watch TV, or go to a movie; (f) stay home by myself; and (g) think about how I feel.
Results
Table I presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of the vari-
ables from Study 5. Global explanatory style was associated with the past experience
of psychological problems (r = .25, p < .05), and the number of accidents requir-
ing medical attention was predicted by global explanatory style (r = .18, p < .05),
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psychological problems (r = .09, p < .05), reckless response to bad moods (r = .12,
p < .05), and male gender (r = .06, p < .05). As in Study 1, these zero-order cor-
relations mostly replicate what is known about risk factors for accidents, although
once again ethnicity, coded as 1 (White) versus 0 (not White), was not related to acci-
dents (r = .03, p < .05). Global explanatory style was also correlated with reckless
response to bad moods (r = .21, p < .05). These variables (except ethnicity) were
then included in two ordinary least-squares multiple regressions testing whether
reckless reponses mediated the link between globality of explanatory style and
accidents.
The first regression predicted the number of reported mishaps from gender
(entered first), psychological problems (entered second), globality of explanatory
style (entered third), and reckless response to a negative mood (entered last). The
overall regression was significant (R2 = .04, F = 13.18, p < .001). Reckless response
to negative mood was a significant predictor of accidents (β = .07, t = 2.43, p <
.015), even after controlling for the effects of male gender (β = .03, t = .94, ns),
psychological problems (β = .04, t = 1.43, ns), and explanatory style (β = .16, t =
5.31, p < .001).
The second regression predicted reckless response to a negative mood from
gender (entered first), psychological problems (entered second), and globality of
explanatory style (entered last). The overall regression was significant (R2 = .12,
F = 54.69, p < .001). Explanatory style remained a significant predictor of reckless
response to negative mood (β = .20, t = 7.44, p < .001), even after controlling for
the effects of male gender (β = .26, t = 9.71, p < .001) and psychological problems
(β = .10, t = 3.61, p < .001).
Taken together, these results imply that the link between explanatory style and
accidents is mediated in part by a reckless response to a negative mood. Using the
same analytic strategy, we also explored the role of the other responses to a negative
mood as possible mediators of the link between explanatory style and traumatic
mishaps. Distracting oneself by eating and drinking was also a partial mediator. This
finding, not detailed here, is nonetheless consistent with our overall thinking about
how explanatory style predisposes accidents: by encouraging potentially dangerous
behavior.
As might be expected, males and females differed with respect to most of the
responses to a negative mood, in ways consistent with more extensive studies by
Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, and Grayson (1999). That is, males were more likely than
females to behave recklessly or to ignore their feelings, whereas females were more
likely than males to eat or drink, to see friends, to stay home, or to think about their
feelings.
Discussion
Study 5 showed one more time that the link between explanatory style and
accidents originally described by Peterson et al. (1998) holds for mundane mishaps.
The new finding from this study was the demonstration that those who catastrophize
(explain bad events with global causes) are at increased risk for accidents in part
because they behave in reckless or dangerous fashion in response to a negative
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mood. This finding helps make sense of the previous results implying links among
explanatory style, risk-taking, and dysphoria. That is, catastrophizers apparently take
risks to escape negative moods.
The limitations mentioned for Study 1 apply to these data: the study was cross-
sectional, and the explanatory style measure this time consisted of only one item. We
do note that the correlation between globality of explanatory style and psycholog-
ical problems was comparable to that obtained with more established measures of
explanatory style, adding to the construct validity of the abbreviated measure used
here and in Study 1.
STUDY 6
To demonstrate generality, we report a final study in which we included questions
about dangerous activities and predicted that answers would relate to explanatory
style on the one hand and frequency of accidents on the other. This study was an in-
vestigation of hospitalized trauma patients originally undertaken for other purposes.
However, many of the patients in this study completed a measure of explanatory
style, and most reported on the frequency of dangerous habits like drinking and
driving. The outcome variable of interest was trauma recidivism: that is, the number
of times patients had previously been hospitalized for a traumatic mishap. Not only
did Study 6 make it possible to replicate some of the findings already reported, but
it used a different population than the college student samples so far described.
Method
In 1996 and 1997, patients 18 years or older admitted to the University of
Michigan Trauma Unit were approached for consent to participate in a study if
they met these criteria: (a) a traumatic accident within 24 hr of admission; (b) the
absence of a paralyzing spinal cord injury; and (c) a Glasgow Coma Scale of 15 (i.e.,
full consciousness and responsiveness) within 24 hr of admission or extubation. Ap-
proximately 70% of patients approached gave their consent. Demographic data were
available from hospital records, including sex and age. During the initial hospitaliza-
tion, individual interviews were conducted within 48 hr of admission or extubation.
Questionnaires were orally administered and included somewhat varying measures
of preinjury psychosocial characteristics and physical health (see Michaels et al.,
1998, for details).
Of interest for the present purposes, 218 patients had responded to measures
of explanatory style, dangerous habits, and the number of prior accidents requiring
hospitalization during the past 5 years. Patients in this sample were 74% male, 84%
white, and on average 38 years of age (SD = 14.3). Ethnicity was not related to any
of the variables of interest and is not further mentioned. Each patient had answered
a three-item version of the ASQ, which yielded stability and globality scores. As in
the previous investigations, stability and globality scores were correlated (r = .44,
p < .01) and were combined into a single explanatory style measure. These patients
also had reported on the frequency of risky activities like using recreational drugs,
sharing needles, driving while intoxicated, and being cited for moving violations.
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Responses were made on 0–5 scales (0 = never, 5 = always/frequently) and then
averaged across ten dangerous habits.
Results
Table I again presents the means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of the
major variables of interest in Study 6. Females were more hopeless than males
(r = .23, p < .001) but reported less risky habits (r = −.21, p < .002). Older
patients had fewer past hospitalizations than younger patients (r = −.20, p < .003)
and also reported less risky habits (r = −.30, p < .001). Patient age and gender were
therefore partialled from subsequent analyses. In terms of these partial correlations,
stability and globality of explanatory style was correlated as expected with the fre-
quency of dangerous activities (ρ = .13, p < .05), which in turn was correlated as
expected with trauma recidivism (ρ = .22, p < .05), suggesting mediation.
As in the previous studies, we investigated mediation by computing ordinary
least-squares regressions. First, we predicted trauma recidivism from gender and age
(entered first), explanatory style (entered second), and dangerous activities (entered
last). The overall regression was significant (R2 = .10, F = 5.57, p < .001). Danger-
ous activities remained a significant predictor of traumatic injuries (β = .22, t = 3.16,
p < .002) after controlling for the effects of male gender (β = .02, t = .28, ns), age
(β = −.13, t = 1.91, p < .06), and explanatory style (β = .22, t = 1.05, ns). In the sec-
ond multiple regression, we predicted dangerous activities by entering first gender
and age and then explanatory style. The overall regression was significant (R2 = .15,
F = 12.15, p < .001). Explanatory style remained a significant predictor of danger-
ous activities (β = .13, t = 1.98, p < .05), even after controlling for the effects of
male gender (β = .22, t = 3.39, p < .001) and age (β = −.29, t = 4.55, p < .001).
Discussion
These results were not as robust as the findings of the other studies, perhaps
because the sample of trauma patients was more heterogeneous and because the
outcome variable (trauma recidivism) is multiply determined. Regardless, Study 6
found that explanatory style was related to the occurrence of traumatic mishaps and
that the link involved in part the pursuit of dangerous yet exciting habits. Study 6
focused on more severe accidents than did our other investigations, and we measured
dangerous habits rather than preference for dangerous activities or settings, but
the interpretation of the findings appears to be the same. Unhappy individuals—
presumably identifiable by their hopeless explanatory style—favor activities that
promise excitement while ignoring potential risks. They are more apt to be hurt
repeatedly than their counterparts with more hopeful explanatory styles.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND SIGNIFICANCE
Figure 1 summarizes the findings of the six studies in terms of a process by which
explanatory style might put someone at risk for traumatic accidents. A hopeless or
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Fig. 1. Summary of results.
catastrophizing explanatory style—in which bad events are habitually explained with
stable or global causes or both—is associated with dysphoria, which in turn can lead
to risky behavior, which eventually can result in trauma.
None of these studies is perfect. We point to the small sample size of Study 3 and
consequent low power; perhaps we were unable to detect additional mediators as a
result. We also point to the large sample sizes of Studies 1, 5, and 6 and the fact that
small magnitude relationships therefore attained statistical significance. A related
problem in these particular studies was the abbreviated nature of the explanatory
style measures. Finally, the studies described here relied on self-report measures, and
most had a cross-sectional design.
The most obvious question about this research is whether we have identified
the best way of characterizing the links among explanatory style, mood, risk taking,
and trauma. Alternative causal models can be proposed. For example, perhaps a
history of trauma influences explanatory style, making it more hopeless, which in
turn influences negative mood. We explored this alternative model where possible in
each of the cross-sectional studies, finding that it did not account for the data nearly
as well as the hypothesized cascade. We also looked at other data available to us and
found that causal explanations offered for traumatic events were not more stable
and global than the causal explanations offered for more generic bad events (e.g.,
Peterson & Villanova, 1988). Nonetheless, future research should use longitudinal
designs to test further the model proposed here against alternatives. It will be worth
keeping in mind that our mediational analyses implied partial but not complete
mediation by the variables we examined, meaning that future researchers will need
to assess a broader array of constructs.
For the time being, we conclude that our results tell a coherent story across
different samples, designs, and measures. We believe that we are reporting a genuinely
new and potentially important finding that clarifies the earlier discovery by Peterson
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et al. (1998) that individuals with a hopeless explanatory style are at increased risk for
accidental death. As noted, explanatory style is not the only risk factor for traumatic
injury, and it is not a robust one, but the identification of any psychological factor
predisposing trauma is intriguing.
Traumatic accidents are the third leading cause of death in the contemporary
United States, trailing only cancer and heart disease; traumatic accidents are also
the overall leading cause of death for individuals under 45 years of age, and the
leading cause of lost productivity (Baker et al., 1992). Psychologists have frequently
studied intentional trauma (abuse, assault), while paying comparatively little atten-
tion to unintentional trauma. These studies help to correct this imbalance, and they
have practical implications. Perhaps individuals at risk for traumatic accidents can
be identified prior to any mishap by virtue of their explanatory style. Perhaps trauma
recidivism can be reduced by interventions like cognitive therapy that are known
to change explanatory style in a more hopeful direction (Seligman et al., 1988).
And perhaps primary prevention of accidents is possible by cultivating hopeful ex-
planatory styles among the young (Jaycox, Reivich, Gillham, & Seligman, 1994).
Another prevention strategy suggested by our results is to encourage people to
think differently about what makes an activity fun or exciting (Peterson & Moon,
1999).
Our results also have theoretical implications. First, they lead us to rethink
the diathesis–stress hypothesis central to the learned helplessness reformulation:
explanatory style (the diathesis) supposedly interacts with negative life events (the
stress) to produce difficulties. Perhaps because helplessness theory and research orig-
inated in the animal learning laboratory, where experimenters control what does or
does not occur, helplessness researchers have assumed that explanatory style and
negative life events are independent. The results suggest to the contrary that the
diathesis can be a risk factor for a potent stress, which may explain why empirical
support for the diathesis–stress hypothesis is checkered at best.
A second theoretical point is that explanatory style has a richer meaning than
simply a risk factor for learned helplessness. The construct has taken on a life of its
own, and the present results suggest that people with a hopeless explanatory style
may be more than just immobile. They may also become risk takers in an attempt
to escape negative moods because they do not properly foresee the consequences
of their actions. When the learned helplessness phenomenon was first described, it
was said to entail a set of deficits: behavioral, cognitive, and emotional. In this set of
studies, the only deficit to which explanatory style was linked was a cognitive one;
the behavioral and emotional consequences of explanatory style are better regarded
as active responses, however dysfunctional they may be.
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